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Ivo Wallimann-Helmer, Zurich  
Differentiating Responsibilities for Climate Change Adaptation 
 
In the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF), the parties to the United Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed “that adaptation is a challenge faced by all 
Parties, and that enhanced action and international cooperation is urgently required to enable 
and support the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and 
building resilience in developing country Parties […].”1 Furthermore, the conference of the 
parties (COP) requests the developed countries to provide developing countries with 
additional finance, technology, and capacity-building.2 This paper argues that this decision 
tends to oversimplify matters because it seems to differentiate responsibilities for climate 
change adaptation according to differences in the contribution to anthropogenic climate 
change only. However, the differentiation of responsibilities for climate change adaptation is 
more complex than it first appears to be. 
To show why the differentiation of responsibilities for climate change adaptation is 
more complex, this paper analyzes the aspects of responsibility as a fourfold concept.3 
Someone (i. the subject of responsibility) is always responsible for something (ii. the object of 
responsibility), answerable to some institution (iii.), and held accountable to a norm (iv.). The 
paper argues, first, that the appropriate object of responsibility in climate change adaptation is 
the burdens to be shared for effective and efficient adaptation. Second, for such adaptation to 
occur, however, subjects of responsibility should not only be developed countries. If 
appropriate competence and decision-structures are given in developing countries, these 
countries should also be deemed responsible for their own adaptation. Third, the paper shows 
that those vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change should decide on their own what 
adaptation measures they wish to take. Fourth, the argument of this paper suggests that 
ability-to-pay principles are the most appropriate norms by which to blame countries for 
failing their responsibilities in climate change adaptation.  
 
1. What Is the Object of Responsibility for Adaptation? 
The CAF invites all parties to foster action on adaptation by “taking into account their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities […]”.4 This invitation 
does not define how responsibilities for adaptation have to be differentiated. But it says that 
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differentiating responsibilities for adaptation should take into account that not all parties are 
equally capable of taking responsibility for adaptation. The CAF suggests that developed 
countries subsidize adaptation in developing countries. From an ethical point of view, 
however, it is not clear why this decision is justified and to what extent differentiating 
responsibilities for adaptation with regard to financial support is appropriate. 
One widely recognized principle justifying the responsibility of developed countries to 
subsidize assistance for adaptation holds that developed countries currently contribute and 
have historically contributed more to climate change than developing countries. According to 
this so-called polluter-pays principle, developed countries are responsible for their past and 
current emissions. Since these emissions cause the adverse effects of climate change, which 
make adaptation necessary, developed countries have a duty to assist developing countries 
that have contributed or currently contribute significantly less to climate change. On this 
account, the quantity of past and current emissions for which countries are responsible 
decides the way in which responsibilities for adaptation have to be differentiated. This 
argument, however, disguises the goal of adaptation measures. It emphasizes the idea that 
polluters should pay for their emissions but ignores the fact that adaptation is meant to enable 
vulnerable countries or communities to cope with the adverse effects of climate change, 
which cannot be prevented by mitigation.5 There are two reasons why this is problematic. 
First, the goal of adaptation is different from that of mitigation.6 Whilst in the case of 
mitigation it makes perfect sense to differentiate responsibilities according to emissions, this 
is less convincing in the case of adaptation. It makes sense to differentiate responsibilities for 
mitigation regarding differences in emissions because the goal of mitigation policy is to 
prevent dangerous climate change by ensuring that an emission budget is not exceeded. 
Remaining within an emission budget is necessary to keep the rise of global mean 
temperature below a certain level. In global climate politics, the 2°C threshold has become 
prominent, because more warming than this would lead to dangerous climate change. Hence, 
holding countries responsible for their emissions means holding them responsible for their 
contribution to the overall goal of preventing dangerous climate change. Furthermore, in 
many cases those countries emitting more are also better able to reduce their emissions. High-
emitting countries both typically possess the technological knowledge necessary to reduce 
their emissions most efficiently and are better able to do so effectively. This effectiveness is 
because high-emitting countries can often reduce so-called “luxury emissions” but do not 
have to reduce the emissions necessary to secure subsistence for their citizens.7 
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In the case of climate change adaptation, by contrast, the goal is different. Adaptation 
measures are not meant to avoid dangerous climate change by reducing emissions. Rather, 
adaptation to climate change aims at coping with the threat of climate impacts. For instance, 
building seawalls prevents or at least minimizes the risk of negative climate impacts. In the 
case of adaptation, the object of responsibility is different; what matters here are not 
emissions but subsidizing, implementing, and maintaining appropriate adaptation measures 
where human beings and natural systems are under threat of climate impacts. Moreover, 
subsidizing adaptation is more efficient if those who assist already possess appropriate 
scientific and managerial knowledge. Similarly, adaptation is more effective if those 
implementing adaptation measures are also able to maintain them for longer periods. Thus, 
the capacity to subsidize, implement, and maintain adaptation is more relevant to 
differentiating responsibilities for climate change adaptation than differences in emissions. 
However, it is important to note that such a differentiation is more plausible if it not only 
captures capacity for financial support but also for transfer of knowledge and technology. 
Second, there is also an ethical argument why the capacity to subsidize adaptation is 
more relevant to differentiating responsibilities for climate change adaptation than emissions. 
Responsibilities for emissions are significantly limited. Responsibilities for emissions can be 
ascribed to man-made emissions but not to those caused naturally. Natural climate variability 
is not man-made, so human communities, including countries, cannot be responsible for it. 
Hence, if responsibilities for climate change adaptation are differentiated according to the 
quantity of emissions, then the scope of these responsibilities is restricted to climate impacts 
which are anthropogenic.8 This means that countries would only be responsible for 
subsidizing adaptation measures if climate impacts were not merely observed but also 
attributable to anthropogenic climate change.9 Countries and communities vulnerable to 
impacts due solely to natural climate variability would not be owed assistance. From an 
ethical point of view, this seems to be erroneous. If human beings face a severe threat they 
cannot cope with by themselves, they are owed assistance, irrespective of its cause. 
To be sure, one could counter this argument by saying that, although duties of 
assistance in cases of natural climate variability exist, they should not be dealt with under the 
CAF, since the CAF is only concerned with anthropogenic climate change. This critique 
certainly bears some relevance, but it oversimplifies matters. Anthropogenic climate change is 
only one of the causes of vulnerability to negative climate effects. Detecting that a country or 
a community needs to adapt to climate change is one thing, but attributing this need to 
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anthropogenic climate change is quite another. This is not only because detection and 
attribution (D&A) research is not able to attribute all hazardous weather events and slow-
onset events caused by changing climatic conditions to anthropogenic emissions. The 
vulnerability of countries and communities is also increased by socio-economic disadvantage, 
which is not caused by climate change at all.10  
Since in many cases adaptation measures have to be taken today, it would be 
problematic to wait until D&A research has proven which fraction of climate variability can 
be distinctively attributed to human emissions. Waiting that long would mean that it is often 
too late for a country or community to cope with climate impacts by adapting and that they 
have to face loss and damage which could have been prevented. Moreover, since vulnerability 
to climate impacts due to socio-economic disadvantage is not caused by climate change, 
differentiating responsibilities for adaptation according to emissions would not take these 
disadvantages into account. It would secure measures relative to the magnitude of 
anthropogenic climate impacts but not in accordance with socio-economic deprivation.11  
From an ethical point of view, this approach appears to be devastating, because those 
vulnerable to climate impacts due to socio-economic disadvantage would be left without 
appropriately differentiated assistance. Both natural climate variability and socio-economic 
disadvantage play their most significant roles in developing countries and communities which 
are not able to cope with climate impacts on their own.12 Thus, if we believe that those in 
need are first and foremost owed assistance simply because they need it, rather than trying to 
differentiate responsibilities according to emissions, ethically speaking it is more appropriate 
to see which countries and communities are best able to subsidize, and help implement, and 
maintain adaptation measures irrespective of how much they have contributed to 
anthropogenic climate change. 
Both arguments provided in this section suggest that, with climate change adaptation, 
the object of responsibility should not be emissions. To secure an ethically appropriate, 
efficient, and effective distribution of responsibilities for adaptation, it is more plausible to 
differentiate responsibilities by the different capacities of countries and communities to 
subsidize, implement, and maintain adaptation measures. Moreover, so as not to leave those 
most in need of assistance without help, the object of responsibility for climate change 
adaptation should not be limited to anthropogenic climate impacts. Those capable of 
subsidizing, implementing, and maintaining adaptation should be deemed responsible for 
helping those who are not able to cope with the adverse effects of climate change on their 
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own, irrespective of whether climate impacts are anthropogenic or due to natural climate 
variability. 
 
2. Who Is Responsible for Adaptation? 
According to the argument in the previous section, a crucial distinction between mitigation 
and adaptation is between the different objects of responsibility they cover. Responsibility for 
mitigation concerns emissions because the goal of mitigation is to keep global warming below 
the 2°C threshold. Responsibilities for mitigation, therefore, can plausibly be differentiated 
according to differences in emissions. Responsibilities for adaptation, by contrast, concern 
subsidizing, implementing, and maintaining adaptation measures. In consequence, the object 
of responsibility for adaptation is more plausibly the burdens of securing adaptation. 
However, to infer from this conclusion that responsibilities for adaptation should 
simply be ascribed to developed countries according to their different capacities to subsidize, 
and help implement, and maintain adaptation is too quick. First, such an inference does not 
take into account the fact that the parties to the UNFCCC in 2013 established the Warsaw 
International Mechanism (WIM) “to address loss and damage associated with impacts of 
climate change […]”.13 Second, such an inference ignores the fact that, in the long run, 
implementation and maintenance of adaptation measures are most efficient and effective if the 
governments and in many cases local communities concerned are suitably involved as 
responsible agents. This section considers both these claims and reformulates the objectives of 
responsibilities for adaptation accordingly. 
First, at their 19th conference in Warsaw (COP 19) the parties to the UNFCCC 
established the WIM under the CAF, “acknowledging that loss and damage associated with 
the adverse effects of climate change includes, and in some cases involves more than, that 
which can be reduced by adaptation, […]”.14 In accordance with the loss and damage (L&D) 
literature, this acknowledgement states that at least some of the adverse effects of climate 
change cannot be addressed by “adaptation” measures.15 Hence, according to this political 
decision there is a difference in the objectives of responsibility when “adaptation” is 
concerned and when L&D is at issue. This makes it necessary to find a distinct way to 
distinguish responsibilities for “adaptation” from those for L&D. But since both “adaptation” 
in the sense of the 2/CP.19 decision and L&D currently figure under the umbrella of the CAF, 
both kinds of responsibilities can be seen as relevant for differentiating responsibilities for 
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adaptation in a broader sense. Hence, adaptation in the CAF seems to be understood as a 
wider concept than in the 2/CP.19 decision. 
However, it is not an easy task to distinguish between “adaptation” and L&D. One 
conception which can help to draw such a distinction has been proposed by Dow et al.16 
According to them, the limits of “adaptation” are reached when climate risks become 
intolerable. The object of responsibility in the case of “adaptation” is the implementation and 
maintenance of measures perceived as having the potential to keep climate risks within a 
range of acceptable or tolerable risk, for example when dykes are built because they are 
believed to allow a community to cope with high river flow or sea-level rise. The object of 
responsibility with regard to L&D is different. L&D measures must enable countries or 
communities to deal with intolerable risks of climate impacts. Such measures include, for 
example, early warning systems deemed to minimize the number of deaths instead of keeping 
the risk of deaths within an acceptable or tolerable range. They also include measures 
allowing a community to fairly compensate victims of L&D. 
This paper cannot provide a full justification for why it is appropriate to distinguish 
between “adaptation” and L&D along the lines proposed by Dow et al., and neither can it 
elaborate on the ethical implications of this distinction.17 But since the WIM falls within the 
scope of the CAF, and if claims in L&D literature are taken seriously, then differentiating 
responsibilities for adaptation also involves considering the distinction between adaptation 
and L&D. In the case of “adaptation”, the object is the burdens of keeping risks of climate 
impacts within an acceptable or tolerable range. With L&D, the object of responsibility is the 
burdens of realizing measures suitable for dealing with intolerable risks of climate impacts. 
In light of the different objectives of responsibilities for “adaptation” and L&D, a 
more fine-grained ascription of responsibilities for adaptation (in the broader sense of the 
term) is possible. Regarding acceptable and tolerable risks, it seems plausible that countries 
which command better knowledge and technology in such matters have a greater 
responsibility to subsidize, help implement, and maintain the respective measures. By 
contrast, the scientific, managerial, and technological capacity to deal with intolerable risks of 
climate impacts increases the responsibility to subsidize, implement, and maintain L&D 
measures. In consequence, distinguishing between acceptable, tolerable and intolerable risks 
of climate impacts allows the differentiation between responsibilities to contribute knowledge, 
management, and technology to one or the other category of measures.  
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However, attributing responsibility with regard to “adaptation” or L&D measures in 
the way just proposed tends to charge developed countries with subsidizing adaptation and 
ignores the fact that the parties to the CAF decided to build resilience and enhance knowledge 
mainly in and not for the countries and communities most vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change.18 Taking this goal into account leads to further differentiations of 
responsibilities and changes what assistance appropriate for climate change adaptation from 
developed countries would mean. Assistance should not be limited to fostering adaptation in 
vulnerable countries but should also enable the governments and community leaders of these 
countries to take responsibility for adaptation in their regions of concern. Hence, these 
governments and leaders need to be provided with knowledge, understanding, technology, 
and resources so that they and their scientific and managerial staff are able to implement and 
maintain appropriate adaptation measures. 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are a telling example for illustrating the case. 
Because of their geographic conditions, SIDS societies are traditionally used to adapt to 
varying weather conditions. However, recent empirical research shows that little progress has 
been made towards appropriate climate change adaptation in SIDS.19 Why is this the case? 
First, in many SIDS, people, governments and community leaders lack appropriate 
knowledge and understanding concerning climate change. And even if there is knowledge and 
understanding about climate change, climate change is not perceived as a threat but rather as 
something foreign and distant.20 Second, although both these challenges not only concern 
SIDS but also developed countries, they are more significant in the former, because 
institutional structures tend to be weak and privilege local leaders rather than central 
governments. These conditions in SIDS tend to render subsidies for adaptation inefficient, 
because those who could most efficiently implement adaptation measures have insufficient 
knowledge and understanding about climate change or tend to see it as a foreign concept not 
concerning their countries and communities.21 
Third, lack of knowledge and appropriate institutional conditions in SIDS tend to 
render adaptation measures inefficient. The latter are often implemented with donor money. 
This means that priorities for adaptation are often set by donors as well. Moreover, 
governments applying for donor money tend to propose the adaptation projects that are most 
likely to be funded instead of setting their own priorities. As a consequence, adaptation 
becomes ineffective, either because measures protect infrastructure and coasts inappropriately 
or because measures lead to more severe impacts elsewhere. Furthermore, SIDS societies may 
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lack resources for maintaining adaptation measures when they are no longer subsidized by 
donors. Hence local communities may be left as vulnerable as before, or even more 
vulnerable.22 
Generalizing, these empirical findings from SIDS allow the conclusion that assistance 
in adaptation tends to be inefficient if it is not accompanied by suitable education and training 
of governments and local political leaders as well as a strengthening of decision structures.23 
Furthermore, adaptation tends to become ineffective if vulnerable countries and communities 
are not involved in decisions concerning which measures have to be implemented and 
where.24 And when measures are implemented, adaptation is more effective if governments 
and community leaders are able to maintain these measures themselves.25 Hence, in line with 
most invitations in § 14 of the CAF, these observations suggest that the object of 
responsibility of developed countries concerning adaptation should not be limited to 
subsidizing adaptation by transferring knowledge, managerial competence, and technology for 
developing countries. For adaptation to be efficient and effective, the object of responsibility 
includes fostering appropriate competence and decision structures in developing countries as 
well. 
This means that responsibilities for adaptation should be further differentiated among 
developed countries depending on how well they are suited to support appropriate decision 
structures and programs for competence building in developing countries. The goal must be to 
enable vulnerable countries and communities to take responsibility for their own adaptation. 
Therefore, differentiating responsibilities for adaptation not only concerns developed 
countries but also developing countries and communities vulnerable to climate change 
impacts. It is these countries that should be deemed responsible for implementation and 
maintenance of adaptation measures once the competences and decision structures needed are 
available or have been built. The example of SIDS suggests that enabling developing 
countries to take responsibility for implementation and maintenance of adaptation measures is 
necessary to secure efficient and effective adaptation. 
 
3. Answerable for Adaptation to What Institutions? 
According to the argument in the previous section, responsibilities for adaptation include both 
developed and developing countries. The object of responsibility of developed countries is not 
only to provide knowledge, managerial competence, and technology for developing countries, 
differentiated by the risks of climate impacts and capacities of developed countries to 
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subsidize assistance. Developed countries are also responsible for helping establish decision 
structures and for training and nurturing competence for adaptation in developing countries, 
the goal being to enable developing countries to implement and maintain adaptation measures 
on their own. Depending on the strength of decision structures and competence available or 
built in developing countries, these countries should be deemed responsible for their own 
adaptation. Turning now to the third aspect of responsibility as a fourfold concept, the 
answerability to an institution, makes it necessary to consider to which institutions the 
subjects of responsibility for adaptation identified so far are and should be answerable. 
With the CAF, the COP in Cancun established the Adaptation Committee (AC) “to 
promote the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner […]”.26 
The main purpose of the AC is to gather information on needs concerning adaptation, to 
provide support and guidance, and to ensure availability of information to make adaptation 
efforts more efficient and effective. The AC is answerable to the COP, whilst all parties to the 
UNFCCC are invited to supply information about support provided or needed. In this sense, 
all the subjects of responsibility for adaptation identified in the previous section are 
answerable to the AC, since they are invited to report either the adaptation action taken or the 
assistance needed for adaptation. However, the AC has a mainly coordinative function and, as 
no other body of the COP relevant for adaptation, it has any coercive power. The agents 
bearing responsibility for adaptation, therefore, are not answerable to the AC in the usual 
sense. The AC can neither enforce the responsibilities of developed countries to subsidize 
adaptation nor demand from developing countries that they fulfill their responsibilities for 
implementation and maintenance of adaptation measures. 
Since neither the AC nor any other body of the COP relevant for adaptation have 
coercive power, this situation potentially leads to three kinds of disadvantage for developing 
countries in need of assistance for adaptation. First, countries and communities within which 
knowledge and understanding about climate change are insufficient may not voice their needs 
with regard to adaptation appropriately. Second, if decision structures are weak in countries in 
need of assistance for adaptation, decisions about where and how adaptation measures should 
be implemented will still very much depend on the interests of donors subsidizing adaptation. 
Third, even if these challenges can be met, whether or not adaptation can be subsidized 
depends on the disposition of the countries responsible for assistance to fulfill their financial 
responsibilities. Telling in this respect are the funds for adaptation finance. Although US$ 100 
billion a year by 2020 were pledged for adaptation at Copenhagen in 2009, it is reasonable to 
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doubt whether this money will ever be effectively paid or whether donor countries will simply 
relabel foreign assistance payments as adaptation finance.27 
To address the first kind of disadvantage, insufficient knowledge and understanding 
about climate change, it is important to develop the appropriate competences in developing 
countries. In this respect, the function of the AC to strengthen, consolidate and enhance “the 
sharing of relevant information, knowledge, experience and good practices, at the local, 
national, regional and international levels […]” becomes extremely important.28 However, 
sharing of information is not enough if knowledge and understanding is only shared between 
organizations, centers, and networks promoting adaptation for developing countries. For 
appropriate assessment of adaptation needs, it is important that knowledge and understanding 
about climate change reaches all relevant actors with decisional power in countries and 
communities. Those facing risks of climate impacts are better able to appropriately evaluate 
whether a risk is acceptable, tolerable, or intolerable. How climate risks are evaluated depends 
not only on scientific findings and the adaptive capacity of communities but, significantly, 
also on how they are perceived by those facing these risks.29 
In consequence, competence building in developing countries is of high priority. This 
not only holds because otherwise countries in need of assistance would not be able to advance 
their claims for assistance appropriately. As argued in the previous section, it is also important 
because efficient and effective adaptation is more probable when local conditions are 
thoroughly taken into account. This not only makes knowledge and understanding about 
climate change a necessary condition; for effective and efficient adaptation, appropriate and 
functioning decision structures are crucial too. Moreover, these decision structures need to 
enable communities and even individuals facing climate risks to voice their perceptions of 
these risks. Without appropriate channels to voice these perceptions, it is most likely that 
inappropriate adaptation measures are implemented. 
However, even if both these disadvantages can be overcome, it is still necessary that 
appropriate finance for adaptation is available. Since the adaptation funds of the COP barely 
meet the pledges given by developed countries, the third disadvantage is the greatest 
challenge for efficient and effective adaptation, especially because, according to findings by 
the World Bank in 2010, far more finance is needed than the annual US$ 100 billion already 
pledged by developed countries.30 Adaptation finance is the greatest of the challenges, for 
three reasons. First, whilst the first two challenges can be met with the help of NGOs stepping 
in for developed countries, these organizations will by no means be able to raise enough 
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finance to ensure appropriate implementation and maintenance of adaptation measures. 
Second, within the current climate regime, developing countries fully depend on the 
willingness of developed countries to fulfill their financial responsibilities. The adaptation 
funding institutions of the COP have no coercive power to make developed countries live up 
to their pledges. Furthermore, as the example of Canada has shown, if financial burdens 
become inconvenient, developed countries have a legal right and use this right to opt out of 
climate agreements.31 
To overcome this third disadvantage for developing countries, it is necessary to 
consider whether there is or should be institutions to force developed countries to meet their 
financial responsibilities. Due to the legal structure of the COP, granting its adaptation bodies 
coercive power seems to be unfeasible. In the end, since all these bodies are answerable to the 
COP, they are answerable to all parties of the UNFCCC, among them being developed 
countries, which have a legal right to opt out of any agreement. However, since all countries 
are bound by international and domestic law, another way to make developed countries 
answerable could be institutions of international and domestic law. As discussed by legal 
scholars, developing institutions of international and domestic law so as to enable those under 
threat of climate impacts to file suits for assistance could be an appropriate tool for securing 
adaptation assistance for developing countries, but also any other community and individuals 
facing risks of climate impacts.32 
However, in contrast to international and domestic law suits already filed by plaintiffs 
facing climate impacts, according to the argument in this paper, they should not file suits 
against countries, governments, and community leaders for causing or contributing by their 
decisions to these impacts. Rather, developed countries should be sued for not meeting their 
differentiated responsibilities for adaptation. In the case of adaptation, the governments and 
leaders of both developed and developing countries should be made answerable for not 
appropriately contributing to the subsidizing, implementing, and maintaining of adaptation 
measures, where they are needed. According to the differentiations of responsibilities argued 
for in the previous section, developed countries have different responsibilities according to 
their capacities either to subsidize “adaptation” and L&D measures or to foster programs for 
competence building and appropriate decision structures in developing countries. At the same 
time, as was shown before, depending on their decision structures and competences, 
developing countries and their communities should be deemed responsible for implementation 
and maintenance of adaptation measures. In consequence, it should not only be possible for 
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developing countries to file suits against developed countries but also for communities and 
individuals of developing as well as developed countries facing climate risks to sue their own 
governments and leaders for ineffective and inefficient adaptation action. 
 
4. Responsible According to What Norm? 
The argument of this paper is based on an understanding of responsibility as a fourfold 
concept, which allows a differentiation of the responsibilities for adaptation; someone (i. the 
subject of responsibility) is always responsible for something (ii. the object of responsibility), 
answerable to some institution (iii.), and held accountable to a norm (iv.). Thus far, the paper 
has argued that the appropriate object of responsibility in the case of climate change 
adaptation is the burdens to be shared for effective and efficient adaptation. For effective and 
efficient adaptation, however, subjects of responsibility should not only include developed 
countries subsidizing adaptation. If appropriate competence and decision structures are given 
in developing countries, these countries should be deemed responsible for their own 
adaptation as well. To secure these responsibilities, developing countries, communities, and 
individuals facing climate risks should be enabled to file suits against countries, governments, 
and community leaders who are deemed responsible for a specific aspect of adaptation. 
Turning now to the fourth aspect of responsibility, it remains to be seen exactly what 
norms the various subjects of responsibility for adaptation should be accountable to. This 
poses a challenge to the methodology used for the argument in this paper. To say that 
someone is responsible for something does not imply that the way he or she acts or behaves is 
blameworthy or not. For this, a norm has to be justified independently of the concept of 
responsibility. As Bayertz convincingly argued, the concept of responsibility does not found 
ethical evaluations, but carries them.33 This is a significant challenge for debates focusing on 
responsibilities for adaptation, since from an ethical point of view one would like not only to 
understand how responsibilities can be differentiated but also to know the norms on the basis 
of which it is possible to blame countries, governments and community leaders for not 
fulfilling their responsibilities.34  
Disregarding this challenge, however, the argument in this paper would suggest that 
ability-to-pay principles are better suited as norms for evaluating responsible action for 
adaptation than polluter-pays principles, because in the case of adaptation the object of 
responsibility is the burdens to be shared but not the emissions causing the need to adapt. 
Ability-to-pay principles hold that countries, governments, and community leaders should be 
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blamed if they do not meet their responsibilities even though they would be able to do so. 
According to the argument in this paper, what it means to be able to carry the burdens of 
adaptation depends on the ascription of responsibilities differentiated as shown in the table 
below. 
 Subsidize Implement Maintain 
Developed 
Countries 
Provide knowledge, 
technology and finance 
for… 
A.) … measures for 
“adaptation” 
B.) … approaches to 
L&D 
Foster programs 
to… 
C.) … strengthen 
decision 
structures 
D.) … build 
competences 
needed for efficient 
and effective 
implementation. 
Foster programs 
to… 
E.) … strengthen 
decision 
structures 
F.) … build 
competences 
needed for 
sustainable 
maintenance of 
measures. 
Developing 
Countries 
 Given C.) & D.): 
implement 
“adaptation” and 
L&D measures 
Given E.) & F.): 
maintain 
“adaptation” and 
L&D measures 
Indeed, to argue that ability-to-pay principles alone allow countries, governments, and 
community leaders to be blamed for not meeting their responsibilities for adaptation would 
once again simplify matters. Currently, the UNFCCC only distinguishes between Annex I and 
Non-Annex I countries and between developed and developing countries, the latter 
comprising Least Developed Countries (LDC) and nearly all SIDS as subcategories.35 None 
of these categories are differentiated according to the capacities to adapt. The relevant criteria 
to distinguish these countries according to these categories are differences in socio-economic 
development. Thus, these differences alone do not suffice to ascribe the different 
responsibilities for adaptation. Also, information about the capacities of countries to 
subsidize, implement, and maintain adaptation is needed.  
Before such a categorization of countries is agreed, it is difficult if not impossible for 
developing countries, communities, and individuals facing risks of climate impacts to legally 
enforce their claims for adaptation assistance. Thus, as long as it remains unclear which 
countries, governments, and community leaders can be deemed responsible for what aspect of 
adaptation, it is unclear which countries, governments and community leaders to target with 
regard to which unmet responsibilities. This line of argument suggests that, before any such 
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agreement about how to categorize countries with regard to their different responsibilities for 
adaptation is reached, polluter-pays principles are still a practicable and even very much 
needed rule of thumb to ensure enhanced action on adaptation. Since the concept of 
responsibility only carries but does not found ethical norms to evaluate action, this would be a 
pragmatic argument for why polluter-pays principles should not be dismissed altogether. 
However, even though it seems highly plausible that developed countries should be 
deemed responsible for assisting developing countries in adaptation, because developed 
countries have contributed significantly more to the urgency of adaptation and possess better 
knowledge, competence, and technology to assist in adaptation in developing countries, there 
are reasons why developing countries should also assist each other. For reasons of geography 
and shared experience and culture concerning good practice in adaptation, it might be the case 
for some developing countries that they should assist other developing countries as well. 
Differentiating these responsibilities among developing countries, however, requires a 
categorization of capacities to assist, which neither follows the categorization suggested in 
this paper nor corresponds to the manner in which the UNFCCC distinguishes between the 
subcategories of developing countries. 
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